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FETAL HAZARDS, GENDER JUSTICE, AND
THE JUSTICES: THE LIMITS OF EQUALITY
DAVID L. KIRP*
I. INTRODUCTION: "THE MOST IMPORTANT
SEX-DISCRIMINATION CASE . .. "
In an era bereft of Supreme Court rulings that enlarge the mean-
ing of equality, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.' stands as a vivid apparent exception. This 1991 decision out-
lawed what have generally been called fetal protection policies:
corporate rules barring all fertile women from jobs that pose a po-
tential risk to fetuses because they expose workers to high levels of
toxic substances such as lead.2 Johnson Controls, a car battery
manufacturer, argued that the policy was needed to defend the in-
terests of the unborn against the shortsightedness of their mothers.
Three federal appeals courts had embraced that position.3 But the
Supreme Court Justices saw things differently, unanimously view-
ing the rule as a violation of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.4
Although the Johnson Controls Corporation happens to .manu-
facture automobile batteries, 5 the implications of the case reach far
beyond a handful of women in the declining blue-collar sector of
the economy, where jobs are more likely to be lost due to overseas
* Professor of Public Policy, University of California (Berkeley). Portions of this Article
have been adapted from David L. Kirp, The Pitfalls of 'Fetal Protection,' 28 Soc. 70 (1991).
1. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
2. Id. at 1207.
3. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886-87 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), r~v'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d
1543, 1547 (l1th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982).
For arguments supporting Johnson Controls' position, see Amici Curiae Brief of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in Support of Respondent, Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215); Amici
Curiae Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the National Association of
Manufacturers, in Support of Respondent, Johnson Controls (No. 89-1215).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). Johnson Controls was decided by a 9-0 vote, with concur-
ring opinions by Justices White and Scalia. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199.
5. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199.
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competition than to arguments over fetal vulnerability.6 In 1980,
an estimated 100,000 jobs were already closed to women 7 because
of alleged fetal hazards-and this was only the beginning. Some
estimated that twenty to thirty million jobs were at stake, in fields
ranging from housepainting and cabdriving to child care and radi-
ology.8 This reality prompted Judge Frank Easterbrook, dissenting
in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Johnson Controls, to call the
case "likely the most important sex-discrimination case in any
court since 1964, when Congress enacted Title VII." 9
In overturning the workplace restrictions, the Supreme Court
was speaking out for women's rights-more precisely, for the idea
of equal rights that transcend differences in reproductive roles.
Marsha Berzon, who argued the plaintiff's case, called the ruling a
''victory for women and for safety in the workplace [which] makes
it clear that women have the right to make critical work and family
decisions for themselves and for their children."'
When compared with the language of the Seventh Circuit's en
banc ruling," the Supreme Court opinion deserves such hosannas.
In ignoring the plainest implications of law, science, and policy, the
appellate court's decision displayed an almost religious veneration
for the claims of putative fetuses and an indifference, verging on
callousness, to the hard choices faced by working women. By con-
trast, the Supreme Court's judgment stands as a reminder that
"fetal protection," as firms like Johnson Controls employ the
phrase, is really the language of corporate spin control, artfully
designed to evoke support for a practice less idealistic in its moti-
6. For a discussion of the decline of blue-collar employment, see Steve Lohr, Accepting
the Harsh Truth of a Blue-Collar Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, § 1, at 1.
7. Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: the Reconciliation of
Fetal Protection With Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641,
647 n.30 (1981).
8. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT 57-92 (1987). The Cen-
ters for Disease Control estimated that some "827,000 U.S. workers are potentially exposed
to lead on the job." Centers for Disease Control, Surveillance for Occupational Lead Expo-
sure-United States, 1987, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 642, 645 (1989).
9. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 920 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
10. Supreme Court Prohibits Fetal-Protection Policies, RECORDER, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1.
11. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871.
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vation, and less benign in its consequences for the unborn as well
as for working men and women, than the words imply.
Yet the Supreme Court's decision looks decidedly less heroic
when regarded, not as a set of principles abstracted from the com-
monplace but rather as a statement about how to make real-and
literally toxic-choices. Johnson Controls may have invested non-
discrimination with all the meaning it can be made to carry,1 2 but
the opinions of the Justices speak more to the inadequacy of equal
rights reasoning than to its potential to address the matter at
hand.13 As Judge Easterbrook noted in his dissent: "How much
risk is too much is a moral or economic or political question, one ill
suited to the processes of litigation and not the sort of question
Title VII puts to a judge.' 1 4 A less formally constrained conception
of justice requires a language that honors claims about the public
good deeper than merely the right to be treated no worse-or no
better-than someone else because of reproductive capacity.
Since legal rules embody a way of imposing an abstract order on
the unruly specificities of lived lives, this account begins with a
description of the particulars. Part II tells the stories of the women
and men whose lives were remade by the policy on employee expo-
sure to lead. The narrative moves back in time to place protective
rules in their historical context, then up the corporate ladder to
explain the organizational reasoning behind these rules. Parts III
and IV shift from the descriptive and historical to the legal and
analytical, examining the differing judicial understandings of how
12. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1976) ("the antidiscrimination principle
can be and has been extended to encompass a variety of other [nonracial] traits, including
alienage, illegitimacy, and sex"). See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (discussing major developments in antidiscrimination
law from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to 1978).
13. Although Johnson Controls was a unanimous ruling, the Justices were not in com-
plete agreement, particularly as to the scope of the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense. Compare Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204-08 (holding that the in-
creased cost of changing operations does not support a BFOQ defense) with id. at 1210-14
(White, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress intended to provide a BFOQ defense to em-
ployers if changing operations increased expenses) and id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that increased operating expenses due to changing operations or potential tort lia-
bility are sufficient to support a BFOQ defense).
14. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 917 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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to comprehend rules on fetal hazards in terms of equal treatment.
Part V describes how the application of a less equality-driven ap-
proach might enrich the idea of justice in the workplace.
II. THE FACTORY FLOOR AND THE BOARDROOM
A. On the Line
In August, 1982, Ginny Green, then fifty years old, had been
working for eleven years on the battery assembly line at the John-
son Controls plant in Brattleboro, Vermont.15 It was grinding la-
bor, lifting heavy stacks of battery plates hundreds of times a day,
but the money it brought in, nine dollars an hour with time-and-a-
half for overtime, meant she could make a real home for her nine-
year-old daughter. Green knew about the risks of contamination
from the lead she was constantly exposed to, but she also knew
that personal hygiene-what one doctor at Johnson Controls called
"good housekeeping"' 8
-could effectively shield an individual
against lead. Besides, fifty years old and divorced, Green did not
plan on having more children, so that risk, at least, she could
ignore.
Suddenly, however, Ginny Green found herself out of a job, a
victim of the company's new rules that applied to any female em-
ployee under the age of seventy who could not prove she was ster-
ile. The company demoted her to a job as a respirator sanitizer, a
glorified laundress, and she became the butt of fertility jokes in the
plant. While her wages remained the same, her income fell because
overtime work ended. Green did not style herself as a crusader, but
the transfer made her angry. "I felt I was good enough to work on
the line for eleven years. Why take me off now, just because of that
stupid thing.""' Together with several coworkers, she filed a griev-
ance with the union.'8
15. Telephone Interviews with Johnson Controls Employees and Others (Jan. & Feb.
1990) [hereinafter Worker Interviews].
16. Telephone Interview with Dr. Benjamin Culver, University of California (Irvine),
Medical Consultant to the Johnson Controls Fullerton, California Plant (Dec. 1989) [herein-
after Culver Interview]. The Fullerton plant barred women from battery-making jobs at
Culver's urging, even when the rest of the company was simply warning women of the risks.
Id.
17. Worker Interviews, supra note 15.
18. Id.
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A few months later, across the country at Johnson Controls' Ful-
lerton, California plant, twenty-eight-year-old Queen Elizabeth
Foster, a former bank teller earning five dollars an hour, thought
she was starting a more lucrative new career on the battery assem-
bly line.19 "They showed me through the place and I believed I was
capable enough. I've worked on my feet, you know-and I'd be
making something like double what I got at the bank. '20 But when
Foster was sent off for her physical exam, she was told "they didn't
want women who could have kids.... I went through a really bad
trauma."21 Eventually, Foster took her complaint to the California
Fair Employment and Housing Commission, which sided with her;
the company appealed unsuccessfully in state court.2
Foster was unwilling to abandon the possibility of being a
mother in exchange for a job assembling batteries, and for their
part, company officials insisted the policy was "in no way intended
to support or encourage women of childbearing capability to seek
to change this status [through sterilization]."2 Nonetheless, some
women working in toxic settings came to believe that they had no
other realistic choice.24 "I thought there was no option for me.
That was my only way out, to keep my job, to keep my sanity, to
keep my family afloat, '25 said Betty Riggs, twenty-six years old at
the time, who had pushed a reluctant company to hire her for a
decent-paying job in the lead pigments department of American
Cyanamid's Willow Island, West Virginia plant.26 Riggs had one
son and wanted more children, yet when the company announced
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
23. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 878 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
24. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 440-
53 (discussing Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741
F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
25. World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 14, 1989).
26. Id.; see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS
IN THE WORKPLACE 251-61 (1985) (case study of American Cyanamid); FALUDI, supra note
24, at 442 (discussing Betty Riggs); Gail Bronson, Bitter Reaction: Issue of Fetal Damage
Stirs Women Workers at Chemical Plants, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 1 (discussing atti-
tudes of American Cyanamid employees).
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its fetal protection rules, she submitted to surgical sterilization be-
cause her marriage was breaking up and she needed the money. "I
did what I did because I was more or less the sole supporter for a
lot of people who were depending on me. I couldn't let them down.
I was up against a brick wall and there was no place to go but
forward. 27 Yet not long afterward, the company shut down its pig-
ments department, eliminating the jobs that Betty Riggs and four
other women had held onto, at the price of being sterilized. 2s
B. Harmful Effects of Lead Exposure
The toxic properties of lead have been well known since Hip-
pocrates described them in the fourth century B.C.; and lead
poisoning is the oldest recognized occupational disease.29 During
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, workers in the smelting
houses of the Industrial Revolution suffered seizures and loss of
consciousness. Their limbs twisted or went limp with dropsy and
their minds corroded.3"
At that time, the levels of lead carried in the workers' blood
reached many hundreds of micrograms per deciliter, but the cur-
rently permissible levels, established in 1978 by Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation, are far
lower.31 Most scientists accept the OSHA standard, fifty micro-
grams of lead per hundred grams of blood, as being rigorous
enough to prevent the familiar signs of lead poisoning: 32 fatigue,
constipation, hypertension, diminished sexual drive, memory loss,
and mood swings.33 Nevertheless, as researchers have become able
to detect the impact of lead at ever-lower concentrations in the
blood, proposals for radically lowering permissible blood lead levels
have become common; a scientist from the Environmental Defense
Fund, whom the UAW called as an expert witness in the Johnson
27. FALUDI, supra note 24, at 447.
28. Id. at 448.
29. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 8, at 644.
30. ABRAHAM CANTAROW & MAX TRUMPER, LEAD POISONING at vii-viii, 117-54 (1944).
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1991).
32. But see Centers for Disease Control, supra note 8, at 645 ("Although the OSHA Lead
Standard has been in effect for [less than] 10 years, the data in this report indicate that
overexposures to lead continue in many industries.").
33. CANTAROW & TRUMPER, supra note 30, at 117-54.
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Controls case, urged a ceiling of twelve micrograms per deciliter. 34
Yet such a standard would not only be ruinously expensive, it
would also mean shutting down cities such as Los Angeles and
New York City, where average blood lead levels are very high be-
cause of lead in the air.3 5
The risks to the offspring of women who carry high lead levels in
their blood have also been known for centuries.3 6 As recently as the
turn of this century, some women working in china and pottery
factories, palsied by lead, would conceive a child in order to pass
the heavy metal out of their own bodies.3 7 These desperate women
needed no scientist to tell them that a fetus absorbs through the
placenta some of the lead that a mother carries-and that a fetus
so poisoned would be spontaneously aborted or born dead. So fear-
fully did doctors of the time view the impact of lead on the next
generation that lead poisoning was commonly known as race
poison.38
Although such horror stories are history, lead still can
stunt-and perhaps arrest-children's physical and mental devel-
opment if absorbed in sufficient amounts.38 More than 200,000
34. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 312 (E.D.
Wis. 1988), afl'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
35. See Amici Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, in Support of Petitioners,
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215)
[hereinafter ACLU Amicus Brief]. "There are no clear thresholds for any of these effects of
lead," stated Dr. Ellen Silbergeld, an expert for International Union. Dr. Ellen Silbergeld,
Deposition, reprinted in Amici Curiae Brief of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
in Support of Petitioners, Johnson Controls (No. 89-1215).
Dr. J. Julian Chisolm, Director of the Lead Program at the John F. Kennedy Institute in
Baltimore, similarly testified that exposure to lead levels as low as 10 micrograms presented
a grave risk of permanent harm. Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Johnson Controls (No. 89-1215) [hereinaf-
ter Appendix to Petition]. As the cross-examination brought out, however, Chisolm had pre-
viously testified for the lead industries in opposing government efforts to reduce lead levels
in gasoline and had argued for higher "action levels" of blood lead levels. Amici Curiae Brief
of American Public Health Association, in Support of Petitioners, Johnson Controls (No.
89-1215).
36. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 69-70 ("Lead has been recognized
as a reproductive hazard since the days of ancient Rome.").
37. See CANTAROW & TRUMPER, supra note 30, at 84, 143.
38. See id. at 18.
39. See AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERvs., THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS at 1-7, IV-3 to IV-19 (1988). The report also notes that,
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children aged five or younger have blood lead levels higher than
the safe ceiling specified by the Centers for Disease Control.40 Lead
is typically brought home by parents, who carry it away from work
on fingers, hair, and clothing; or else it comes from old paint pried
off walls by small hands; or it is simply inhaled in the urban air.4 '
More is understood about the effects of direct exposure to lead
than about the effects of any other toxic substance.42 Yet on the
precise issue posed by the Johnson Controls policy-when, if ever,
should women be barred from jobs involving otherwise acceptable
levels of toxic exposure-surprisingly little is known, about either
how lead is transmitted from mother to child or how to reduce the
risks of transmission. It is unclear, for instance, whether lead in a
mother's blood-not the levels of the Industrial Revolution, but
levels to which employees at modern-day factories are sometimes
exposed-actually endangers a fetus. 43 If a woman becomes preg-
nant with a blood lead level of forty, as Judge Easterbrook noted
in his Johnson Controls dissent, the risk attributable to that expo-
nationally, 2,380,600 children between the ages of six months and five years-more than one
child in six-are projected to have blood lead levels greater than 15. Id. at 1-12 tbl. 1-2.
Among 3,595,000 pregnant women in the study, 3,800 had blood lead levels exceeding 25;
403,200 had blood lead concentrations exceeding 10. Id. at 1-22.
40. Id. at 1-7, -13.
41. Id. at 1-6. See generally David Bellinger et al., Longitudinal Analyses of Prenatal
and Postnatal Lead Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1037 (1987) (studying blood lead levels and mental and psychomotor development of 249
children living near Boston, from birth to two years of age); Anthony J. McMichael et al.,
Port Pirie Cohort Study: Environmental Exposure to Lead and Children's Abilities at the
Age of Four Years, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 468 (1988) (comparing blood lead level and cogni-
tive ability test scores of 537 children living near a lead smelter, from birth to four years of
age).
42. Jeannette M. Valentine & Alonzo L. Plough, Protecting the Reproductive Health of
Workers: Problems in Science and Public Policy, 8 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 144, 154
(1983). "What is known about reproductive health hazards is far outweighed by what is
unknown." OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 3.
43. Scientists have not examined the data on birth defects for children of lead-exposed
workers since the British studies almost a century ago. Testimony of Dr. Jay Noren, John-
son Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), reprinted in Amici Curiae Brief of Equal Rights Advocates, in Support
of Petitioners, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991)
(No. 89-1215). But see Bellinger et al., supra note 41, at 1037 ("It appears that the fetus
may be adversely affected at blood lead concentrations well below 25 mcg per deciliter, the
level currently defined by the Centers for Disease Control as the highest acceptable level for
young children.").
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sure of her having a learning-disabled child might be one in
two-or it might be one in 2,000 or one in 2,000,000. 44 Thus, the
Johnson Controls standard of thirty is a guess about fetal safety,
not firmly anchored to science.
Businesses that rely on lead and other toxic substances in manu-
facturing could have collected useful data-instead these enter-
prises made policy by hunch and anecdote. Among the 50,000
workers and their families whom Dr. Charles Fishburn, medical
consultant to Johnson Controls, estimated that he had treated, he
recalled encountering just one "damaged child" of a high-lead
mother-a hyperactive youngster-and Fishburn could not be sure
that the harm was caused during gestation. 45 During the 1970s,
American Cyanamid barred fertile women from jobs that might ex-
pose them to any of twenty-nine chemicals, despite a dearth of evi-
dence about the consequences of exposure to any of these chemi-
cals other than lead.46 When OSHA challenged the policy, the firm
narrowed the scope of its workplace exclusions.41
Like other companies that use highly toxic materials in manu-
facturing, Johnson Controls could have taken steps in order to re-
duce the possibility of fetal damage far less draconian than its ex-
clusionary rule. Although the firm had done a great deal to make
the plant less toxic, in response to OSHA requirements, it could
have lowered the levels of airborne lead in its plants still further,
albeit at considerable cost.4s
More realistically, the corporation could have limited the reach
of its policy. Its rule barred all women between the ages of seven-
teen and seventy from line jobs where lead levels can run high,
44. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 916 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Easterbrook was work-
ing in the Solicitor General's Office at the time OSHA developed its rules on exposure to
lead, and he defended the agency against industry attack. See Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
45. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 877.
46. See Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d
444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47. FALUDI, supra note 24, at 444-49.
48. The company reported that it had invested $15 million on environmental engineering
controls for its battery division in order to lower lead levels. Testimony of Dr. Jean Beau-
doin, Johnson Controls Health and Safety Manager, cited in Appendix to Petition, supra
note 35.
19921
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unless they could prove their sterility.49 But not all women are
equally likely to conceive: among blue-collar women over thirty,
the birth rate is less than two percent; and among all women aged
forty-five to forty-nine, just one in 5,000 has a child in any given
year.50 The company's policy kept fertile women from any job from
which they might eventually be promoted into battery making.
This effectively denied women ninety-five percent of the jobs at
Johnson Controls, even though barely a third of those jobs actually
had workers with unacceptable lead levels.51 It revealed a corpo-
rate concern for efficient management, not health risks.
Risk-limiting measures short of banishment from the workplace
were available, even for women who actually became pregnant.
Many experts believe that lead crosses the placenta from mother
to fetus in the last months of gestation.2 Because blood lead levels
decline sharply in a matter of months, offering women the option
of regular pregnancy tests and transferring women workers from
the assembly line as soon as they become pregnant would substan-
tially reduce the potential harm that a mother's exposure could
cause the fetus."
Moreover, Johnson Controls could have delivered clearer infor-
mation on the risks of exposure and on how an individual worker
could reduce those risks. Informing women that it was dangerous
to become pregnant while working in a lead-tainted environment
was company policy between 1977 and 1982, when the fetal
hazards rule went into effect.54 Exposure while pregnant is as risky
as smoking, ran the message, 55 but this was a weak scare at a time
when the dangers of smoking while pregnant were not widely ap-
49. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 907 (Posner, J., dissenting).
50. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1986, at 57 (1985) (listing 1983 rates); Jeanne M. Stellman & Mary S.
Henifin, No Fertile Women Need Apply, in BIOLOGICAL WOMAN-THE CONVENIENT MYTH
117, 120 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982).
51. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 919 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 877.
53. Id. at 915 n.10 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. J. Julian Chisolm); see supra
note 35.
54. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876.
55. Id. at 907 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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preciated 6 Just eight employees, out of some 275 female workers,
became pregnant with blood lead levels in excess of thirty micro-
grams per deciliter; although one of the infants had elevated lead
levels, no birth defects were reported.57 Although this record is
hardly evidence of a failed policy, the company nonetheless treated
its efforts as a failure.
Differentiating among workers according to their individual
levels of lead concentration was yet another possible company
strategy that went untried. Although a particular person's blood
lead levels might exceed Johnson Controls' trigger for exclusion,
most workers doing the same job will have lower lead
levels-indeed, at any given work station, these concentrations
may range from less than ten to more than forty. Such differ-
ences are primarily related to employees' personal hygiene and
their willingness to use an ungainly but effective respirator, which
OSHA requires employers to offer all workers in high-lead areas.59
By taking these variations into account-treating female work-
ers as individuals, rather than defining them as walking
wombs-companies could have avoided holding all women on the
plant floor to the standard of the least health conscious.
C. The Risk Pool
Although each of these policy alternatives represents a way to
reduce risk, the company's rule implies that zero risk-more pre-
cisely, zero risk of fetal harm attributable to on-the-job exposure
to lead-represented the only acceptable risk level. Supporters of
the fetal vulnerability rule have situated themselves on moral high
56. See Marjorie Williams, Feminism's Unaddressed Issue: Health Risks to Women Who
Smoke, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1991, at A16.
57. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199-200 (1991).
In oral argument, Stanley Jaspan, Johnson Controls' counsel, specified that the company
had 275 women workers in 1984; remarkably, data on the number of women workers during
the period when the warning was in effect were unavailable. Tr. of Oral Argument at 24,
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215)
[hereinafter Tr. of Oral Argument].
58. Telephone Interview with Joan Bertin, Women's Rights Project, ACLU (Feb. 1990)
[hereinafter Bertin Interview]; Telephone Interview with James Cox, Plant Manager of
Johnson Controls' Fullerton, California plant (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter Cox Interview]; Cul-
ver Interview, supra note 16.
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1916.1025 (1991).
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ground as the defenders of future generations. Employers are
"ethically compelled to contribute to protecting their employees'
offspring,"' the United States Catholic Conference asserted. John-
son Controls maintained that even one child born developmentally
disabled would be a very grave injustice and a moral risk that they
could not countenance.6'
Although one might imagine from these posturings that the
women who work at companies like Johnson Controls have the ca-
pacity to exercise judgment little better than a rabbit's, that is, of
course, light years removed from reality. These women have an in-
timate appreciation of the risks. But they also know a different
and more complex truth: there can be no freedom from all risk,
only an individual calculation of net risk. For them, life is lived in
the risk pool. They have chosen to work around lead or some other
toxic substance, not out of selfishness or a misguided sense of lib-
eration, as their corporate and clerical critics charge, but because
they had already had their children, or because they were not in-
tending to become mothers, or because they planned to stop as-
sembling batteries before becoming pregnant, or because they be-
lieved the OSHA standard delivered reasonable assurance that
having a child was safe even for a woman working on the line.2
Most of the women at Johnson Controls would not describe
themselves as feminists. "They are the most traditional women you
would want to meet, '63 says the ACLU's Joan Bertin, who, since
the days of the American Cyanamid litigation, has witnessed how
they calibrate their lives." They are "traditional in their politics,
their sense of men's and women's roles. But their jobs also offered
them a sense of independence and self-confidence that was missing
in other parts of their lives."'65
Compared to the realistic alternatives-filing forms in an office,
dishing up hamburgers at McDonald's, or collecting welfare
checks-jobs in the battery plant brought double and triple the
60. Amici Curiae Brief of the United States Catholic Conference, in Support of Respon-
dent at 13, Johnson Controls (No. 89-1215).
61. See Appendix to Petition, supra note 35.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28.
63. Bertin Interview, supra note 58.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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hourly wages, delivered better health care benefits, and caused less
stress. "What is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed
or working for the minimum wage and unprotected by health in-
surance, in relation to her pregnant sister, exposed to an indeter-
minate lead risk but well-fed, housed and doctored?" asked Judge
Cudahy in his dissent in Johnson Controls.66 "Whose fetus is at
greater risk? Whose decision is this to make?"'67
Johnson Controls' officials regarded such concerns as entirely ir-
relevant. "If there is a greater risk, that's not our concern,"6 s re-
sponded the company's lawyer, Stanley Jaspan, to questioning dur-
ing the appellate argument about these workers' prospects else-
where. However, for the body in question, the fetus, it is surely the
fact of risk, not its source, that matters.
D. The Narrow Laws of the Corporate Policy Makers
These very different perspectives on the character of risk went
unheard by the people who shaped corporate policy at Johnson
Controls. All the audible voices-the foremen, doctors, and law-
yers-were urging the exclusion of women from the shop floor,
even as they offhandedly dismissed the very real possibility that
men as well as women might be vectors of toxic transmission to the
fetus. 9
During the 1970s, businesses like Johnson Controls came under
pressure from the federal government to hire women for their his-
torically all-male line jobs.70 Changing policies, however, did not
necessarily alter attitudes, and many workers remained unhappy to
see women taking these "men's work" jobs. At American Cyana-
mid, which as late as 1973 had no women working on its produc-
tion lines, new female employees encountered a stencilled message,
"Shoot a Woman, Save a Job,' 71 and supervisors reportedly said
66. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 918 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
69. Bertin Interview, supra note 58; Cox Interview, supra note 58.
70. See FALUDI, supra note 24, at 438; see also Bertin Interview, supra note 58; Interview
with Marsha Berzon, plaintiff's counsel in Johnson Controls (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Berzon
Interview].
71. FALUDI, supra note 24, at 443.
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that, "one way or another," 72 the company would get rid of the
women it had been pushed into hiring. Reliance on fetal protection
offered these foremen an easy, sanitized escape hatch.
Company doctors looked at the issue from a very different per-
spective. They had learned in medical school about fetal hazards
stemming from maternal exposure to lead.73 Although some of
these physicians had earlier argued that OSHA's maximum per-
missible levels of workers' exposure to lead were unnecessarily
stringent,74 they believed that fetuses were somehow different. Pro-
tecting women from potential toxic exposure was surely medically
prudent. To do otherwise, some thought, was to court a medical
malpractice suit.7"
The concerns of the company lawyers, who contended that
multi-million dollar lawsuits were likely to be filed on behalf of
damaged fetuses, carried the greatest weight inside the corporate
precincts.76 If this practical worry did not launch the search for
moral qualms, it certainly bolstered them. Such tort liability was
theoretically conceivable because the workmen's compensation sys-
tem, which bars employees from suing on their own behalf,77 does
not foreclose litigation on behalf of fetuses. In fact, however, the
corporation's legal risk was more theoretical than real. Very few
plaintiffs actually have brought such cases; the single case involv-
ing a female employee resulted in a judgment for the company,
even though the company had violated OSHA standards. 78 The
difficulty of demonstrating a causal link between exposure to a
toxic substance and some later harm, as shown by the protracted
72. Bertin Interview, supra note 58.
73. Culver Interview, supra note 16.
74. For a discussion of OSHA's standards and the reaction to them by Johnson Controls,
see generally Brief for Respondent, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
75. Culver Interview, supra note 16.
76. Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1219, 1243-47 (1986).
77. See ELMER H. BLAIR, REFERENCE GUIDE TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 2-1 to 2-2
(1968).
78. Security Nat'l Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 294 (D. Kan. 1985). Notably, po-
tential liability for fetal damage is not limited to women. See Becker, supra note 76, at 1245
n.120 (discussing complaints involving male exposure to the chemical dibromo-
chloroporpane).
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Agent Orange litigation, 9 may explain this paucity of litigation.
Moreover, as a matter of familiar tort principle, it seems unlikely
that a corporation that followed OSHA standards and fully in-
formed its workers of the possible risks could be found liable.
Yet the economics of the bottom line, coupled with talk about
high principle, made the company's decision look easy. By keeping
women off the shop floor, Johnson Controls suffered no competi-
tive disadvantage, since firms such as Dow, DuPont, Goodrich, and
General Motors were doing exactly the same thing.80 With no one
in these rarified corporate environs to describe the realities of the
risk pool, and no one to argue from the workers' viewpoint, dis-
crimination came to seem entirely rational-even genuinely hu-
mane. Aside from the expenses of defending "nuisance" suits, such
as the UAW's case, the costs of the company's policy appeared to
fall entirely on the other side of the ledger.
E. Unnoticed Risks
Sounding morally and medically superior is easy when, as at
Johnson Controls, women are marginal workers. As the UAW
pointed out in its Supreme Court brief: "In male-dominated indus-
tries, there is, from the employer's point of view, little disadvan-
tage to excluding fertile female workers, since male workers are
readily available to fill the positions." 81 Expressions of corporate
concern for the, plight of fetuses, however, have been highly selec-
tive. Businesses that depend heavily on women workers have been
much less scrupulous about the dangers they impose on the un-
born;82 and firms like Johnson Controls, which rely mostly on male
workers, have too quickly discounted the possibility that men's, as
well as women's, exposure to high lead levels might put the fetus at
risk.
Although laundries and dry cleaners use carbon disulfide and
benzene, dental offices are often contaminated with mercury, and
79. See PETER H. SHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
(1986).
80. See Ronald Bayer, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: Bearing the Burden of
Fetal Risk, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 633, 635-36 (1982).
81. Brief for Petitioners at 36-37, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215).
82. See id. at 37.
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laboratories frequently expose workers to benzene and other po-
tentially dangerous toxics, employers in these "women's work" en-
terprises have not introduced Johnson Controls-type rules . 3
Cytomegalovirus (CMV) is perhaps the clearest example of a sub-
stance, harmless to men, which cannot be transmitted through
sperm to a fetus, but which poses a severe risk to the fetus if the
mother is exposed during pregnancy. 4 Young children pass the vi-
rus to pregnant women who then pass it to their fetuses, where it
can wreak awful neurological damage. Unlike dibromo-
chloropropane (DBCP), which companies stopped using once it be-
came apparent that the pesticide caused male sterility, 5 CMV can-
not be eliminated. 6 Yet while the risk of contracting CMV is
greatest among women who work in day care centers, 87 no one has
proposed a fetal hazards policy for day care-there is no one else
to fill these jobs.
Johnson Controls' policy on toxic risk also shaped the lives of
some of the men who worked for the company. In 1984, Donald
Penney and his wife Anna May, who worked at Johnson Controls'
Wilmington, Delaware plant, decided to start a family.8 The
Penneys had read about how fathers as well as mothers conceiva-
bly could inflict lead poisoning upon the fetus. Anna May was safe
because she had a job in a low-lead part of the plant, but Donald, a
mechanic, often worked in the high-lead sections. He asked for a
three month unpaid leave of absence to be reasonably sure he
would father a healthy child. Although leaves were commonplace
in the factory, the company bluntly rejected Penney's request. In
83. See NANCY M. CHENIER, REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AT WORK 44-45 (1982); James C. Hy-
att, Protection for Unborn? Work-Safety Issue Isn't as Simple as It Sounds, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 1977, at 1.
84. Stuart P. Adler, Cytomegalovirus and Child Day-Care Workers, 321 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1290, 1290-91 (1989).
85. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 75-76.
86. Adler, supra note 84, at 1290.
87. Id. at 1291-92.
88. See Testimony of Donald Penney, cited in Amici Curiae Brief of Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, in Support of Petitioners, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-1215) [hereinafter Penney Testimony]. The following
discussion is also based in part on Donald Penney's deposition. Berzon Interview, supra
note 70; Telephone Interview with Carin Clauss, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wisconsin (Jan.
1990).
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his complaint, Penney said that the personnel director berated him
for even raising the idea, telling him to quit if he felt that way. 9
Another individual who had worked for nearly a quarter of a
century around toxins (the ACLU's amicus curiae brief in Johnson
Controls called him John Doe 1) reported that only three of his
five children were still alive; one was stillborn and another devel-
oped cancer early in life.90 He blamed the toxins:
A lot of men have a hard time relating their chemical exposures
to their own health problems or those of their children. Men just
assume that during a pregnancy the health of a baby can only be
affected by something the mother is exposed to. I also think for
economic reasons this issue is a hard one .... You might say
we're sort of caught between a rock and a hard place. Some men
prefer to ignore the health issue and just gamble that they or
their children won't get sick.91
Although a mother can pass toxins to the fetus directly, the link
between father and fetus is more remote and, because less well
studied, more speculative.2 It is well known that, at high lead
levels, sperm as well as ova can become misshapen."' It is uncertain
whether those sperm remain fertile, however, and, if so, whether
this sperm damage translates into the chromosomal damage that
means brain-damaged offspring.9 4 In answering the pertinent pol-
icy question of what to make of this uncertainty, corporations have
depended more on perceptions of sex roles than on the findings of
science. Pennzoil, a leading petroleum company, insisted that the
matter was not even worth looking into because " '[n]o amount of
89. Penney Testimony, supra note 88.
90. ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at A-63 to -64.
91. Id. at A-64 to -65.
92. See Chris Winder, Reproductive and Chromosomal Effects of Occupational Exposure
to Lead in the Male, 3 REPRODUCTIvE TOXICOLOGY REV. 221 (1989) (reviewing studies on the
link between fathers and fetuses). The author concludes that "[a] unisexual workplace lead
policy which excludes only women from exposure to occupational lead hazards leaves male
employees relatively unprotected from the harm that may be associated with paternal lead
exposures." Id. at 230. In an accompanying editorial, the journal took the unusual step of
criticizing that article, citing with approval the district court's opinion in Johnson Controls.
Anthony R. Scialli, Sexism in Toxicology, 3 REPRODUCTIVE ToXICOLOGY REV. 219, 219-20
(1989).
93. See Winder, supra note 92, at 221-22.
94. See Scialli, supra note 92, at 219.
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legislation or regulation can equalize the risks associated with the
reproductive cycle.' ,,95 Testifying in Queen Elizabeth Foster's case,
a corporate physician rather cavalierly characterized the situation:
"If you don't look for a problem, you don't find it."' 6 The doctors
at Johnson Controls, who described themselves as ultraconserva-
tive about female workers, dismissed the evidence on risk from
male-to-fetus transmission as simply too speculative.9 They did so
despite OSHA's determination that, at high levels, lead is poten-
tially dangerous to the newborn, whether carried by the father or
the mother. 8
The preeminence of market values, rather than ethical principles
or medical norms, explains why day-care centers employ pregnant
women-and also why Johnson Controls treated Donald Penney's
request for a leave of absence as a hostile act. "Johnson Controls
standards of ethics provide that it will not engage in any activity
• . . that threatens the physical well-being of any person," 99 the
company declared in a press release, while insisting that there was
no alternative to lead-acid batteries and therefore no way signifi-
cantly to reduce workplace risks. 100 A far less toxic battery could in
fact be made, but only at substantially greater cost. Keeping
women from manufacturing batteries is cheaper than changing the
process of manufacture. For supposedly indispensable male work-
ers, employers calculate costs differently. Cost is not the only rele-
vant consideration, however. Were it otherwise, Title VII would
not be on the books to safeguard individual rights even
against-especially against-efficient forms of discrimination.10'
95. Bayer, supra note 80, at 645 (quoting Pennzoil Company).
96. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
97. Culver Interview, supra note 16.
98. Rebecca L. Rawls, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, CHEMICAL & ENGINEER-
ING NEWS, Feb. 11, 1980, at 28, 36.
99. Backgrounder: Johnson Controls Fetal Protection Policy (July 1989) (unpublished
corporate memorandum).
100. Id.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1988).
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III. FETAL PROTECTION IN THE COURTHOUSE, PART ONE:
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The social distance separating the factory floor from the federal
courthouse is measurable. 102 In June 1989, when counsel argued
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.'03 before the
judges of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, the narratives that gave rise to the litigation were not dis-
cussed. According to the record, Virginia Green was just someone
who had signed her name to a brief, colorless, ghost-written ac-
count of her life; and Dr. Charles Fishburn was a neutral expert,
not a company man. There was never a trial, just a series of attor-
neys' arguments, a pile of depositions with their simplified stories
and lawyer-polished rationales, and a motion for summary judg-
ment that the Seventh Circuit affirmed three months later. 04
Moments before the beginning of that oral argument, Judge
John Coffey, who would write the majority opinion in the case,
leaned over the bench toward the attorneys and said, "[t]his is
about the women who want to hurt their fetuses."'01 5 Coffey's per-
spective-that, more judiciously put, only a self-centered woman
would choose to work in an environment that might menace her
future offspring-echoed the sentiments of the corporation. There
is no place in this calculus for women's choices because there are
no choices for women to make. Would we grant mothers the right
to take away their child's curiosity, the argument runs; do mothers
have the right to starve a child's brain? A woman's insistence on
her right to make batteries becomes a selfish pleasure, morally in-
distinguishable from her maintaining a drug habit. Both women
are child abusers-or so the judge's comment implies.
"The danger of certainty is that it turns against the generous
impulse to open oneself up to the other, and to truly listen, to risk
the chance that we might be wrong."'106 Misplaced certainty, a
blunt refusal to hear an unfamiliar voice, shaped Coffey's opinion,
102. Cf. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 181 (1989) ("Upper-level employment
litigation 'confronts courts with their own worlds.' ").
103. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.. 1989) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
104. Id.
105. David L. Kirp, The Pitfalls of 'Fetal Protection,' 28 Soc. 70, 70 (1991).
106. Drucilla Cornell, The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of Community, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1018 (1987).
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which offered a textbook example of "using stereotypes as though
they were real.' 10 7 That opinion oversimplified a treacherous policy
terrain marked at every juncture by competing interests and obli-
gations-a terrain not well mapped by either the sextants of dis-
crimination or benign paternalism.
The appellate court cast its opinion in Johnson Controls as an
uncontroversial ruling that applied prevailing legal standards to
the facts at hand. Yet as Judge Coffey acknowledged, relatively lit-
tle existed in either the language of the statute or the "developed
theories"'' 0 to guide the analysis. Congress added Title VII's ban
on sex discrimination in 1964 as an undiscussed afterthought-a
reductio ad absurdum, some believed-to legislation that had fo-
cused on race. 0 9 Although the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Act 1 0 specifies that discrimination because of sex includes discrim-
ination based on pregnancy "or related medical conditions,""' it
remained possible to contend that cases about fetal hazards made
up a distinct class of their own.
The difficulties posed by Johnson Controls involve more than
the familiar problem of having to reach a decision with modest
guidance from either statutory text or case law. A fuller apprecia-
tion of the issue at hand-one that goes beyond the cumbersome
legal framework-requires an assessment of how to arrive at a just
decision in the face of enduring uncertainty, as well as determining
whom to entrust with making such decisions. It also entails assess-
ing whether there exists some other way of casting the question,
which does not pit the individual against the corporation. Even
though Judge Coffey acknowledged the limitations of conventional
legal analysis," 2 his opinion buried matters of principle under a
flawed and disingenuous discussion of highly technical points of
law, summoned to justify a supposedly benevolent paternalism.
107. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 51 (1987).
108. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 884 (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172,
1184 (4th Cir. 1982)).
109. Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination, Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 Tax. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1977).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
111. Id.
112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The result was a ruling that failed the jurisprudential test of co-
herence-substituting what one dissenter called "result-oriented
gimmickery" 113 for reasoning-and also failed the broader test of
the public good.
Nondiscrimination is the touchstone but not the absolute rule of
Title VII."4 Sex-based exceptions .on the grounds of "business ne-
cessity"' 15 are warranted, the appellate majority in Johnson Con-
trols contended, if an otherwise sensible and humanely motivated
policy-in this case, one that equally promotes the health of the
offspring of both sexes-happens to affect men and women differ-
ently.1 16 The majority reasoned backwards from result to rationale,
arguing that the benefits promised by the fetal hazards policy were
reason enough to treat the policy as if it were sex-neutral.""
As the dissenters noted, though, any claim of "business neces-
sity" is legally irrelevant when an employment policy explicitly
singles out one sex for exclusion."18 Although even such straightfor-
ward sex discrimination is sometimes permissible in the statutory
scheme of things, Johnson Controls would have had to show that
sterility was a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation"" 9 of the business, a defense
narrowly written by Congress and narrowly construed by the Su-
preme Court. 2 ' The dissenters also pointed to the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act,' 2 ' which specifies that, unless pregnant workers
differ from others in their "ability or inability to work"' 2 2 rather
113. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
114. See, e.g., John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Pro-
posal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1439-41 (1991) (out-
lining the judicially developed tests regarding race and gender under Title VII).
115. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
116. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 883-93.
117. See id. at 888-93.
118. Id. at 913-14 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)).
120. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (stating that defense was not
applicable to height and weight requirements for prison guards); Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that employers may not refuse to hire women with pre-
school children in favor of hiring men).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
122. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 909 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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than their greater susceptibility to some non-work-related harm,
they must be treated like everyone else.'23
The majority dismissed these distinctions among the varieties of
discrimination as a form of "semantic quibbling,' 1 24 which ignored
vital differences between a company whose policy showed stere-
otypical distaste for women and a firm, like Johnson Controls,
which was acting as a responsible citizen.12 5 The "business" of
Johnson Controls, to which an occupational qualification applied,
was not just making batteries, said the majority, but also included
protecting future generations.' 26 This contention legitimated fetal
hazards policies by effectively rewriting the statute to take into ac-
count what the judges saw as a unique situation not contemplated
by the legislators. 2 7
Subordinating legal formalism to social justice is neither unique
nor necessarily disturbing. Yet in this instance, the majority's view
of justice was so fixated on the mother as a vessel of reproduction
that the judgment actually protected no one. Judge Coffey's ap-
praisal of the evidence revealed this fixation in action. As a frame-
work for decision, both sides accepted that the company's rule was
legally unacceptable discrimination unless the firm could show: (1)
that a substantial risk of harm existed; (2) that the risk was borne
only by members of one sex; and (3) that the employee failed to
show that any acceptable alternative policies would have a lesser
impact on the affected sex. 28
Neither party disputed the first point, that exposure to lead
could harm fetuses.'29 Keeping only women, and all fertile women,
from the workplace presumably called for scientific proof of the
kind of harm that might justify such a policy, but Judge Coffey
resorted to legal trickery to finesse that requirement. Misreading
Supreme Court precedent, he shifted the burden of proof to the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 884 (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 896-97.
127. Id. at 900-01.
128. Id. at 884-85 (citing Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1554 (11th Cir.
1984)). The dissenting opinions by Posner and Easterbrook also relied on this standard in
describing the application of fact to law. Id. at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 915 (Eas-
terbrook, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 888.
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plaintiffs; then Judge Coffey determined that the plaintiffs had not
proven that an alternative policy would be "equally effective"130 in
eliminating the hazard because "the challenged [policy] is based
upon the reality that only the female of the human species is capa-
ble of childbearing" '31 and nothing short of exclusion would have
the desired effect.
A demonstration that fathers as well as mothers could transmit
lead to their offspring would have undercut the argument, critical
to Johnson Controls' case, that even though the company's rule
singled out mothers it assured equal treatment for all employees'
children. In fact, the record contained evidence of such paternally
mediated transmission.3 2 Although the studies involving humans
were limited, dated, and flawed, findings from animal studies had
impressed OSHA.' But they did not convince Judge Coffey, who
disdained the research on animals as not constituting "solid scien-
tific data,"' 34 by its very nature too "speculative and unconvinc-
ing." 135 This conclusion had to startle the scientific community-as
well as OSHA and the FDA, which routinely rely on animal re-
search because it is often the best predicate for decision. 36
The implausibility of this "don't confuse me with the facts" ap-
proach to the evidence hints at another explanation for Judge Cof-
fey's refusal to acknowledge that males might be vectors of
risk-an explanation linked to the judge's fixation with "the physi-
cal facts of sex, not social considerations of gender"'3 7 and his con-
ceptualization of the case as involving "women who want to hurt
their fetuses."' 38 The resulting analysis demanded guarantees of
130. Id. at 892 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (em-
phasis added)).
131. Id. at 883.
132. Id. at 889; see also United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1256-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (describing as "abundant" the evidence for the proposition that lead injures the
male, as well as the female, reproductive system).
133. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1257-58.
134. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 889.
135. Id.
136. The Supreme Court has concluded that the Food and Drug Administration may rely
upon animal studies. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 657 n.64 (1980).
137. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regu-
lation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 264 (1992).
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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zero risk to the fetus when it came to women workers-an impossi-
ble expectation-while dismissing men's health concerns.
Like the company's "fetal protection" policy, this judicial double
standard has less to do with the law or the evidence than with a
conception of women's role in the workplace that echoes turn-of-
the-century arguments for protecting women workers. Johnson
Controls' fetal hazards policy represents paternalism, not in its fa-
miliar contemporary form of protecting individuals against mar-
ketplace excess,'39 but in its older guise of barely veiled sexism.
A famous legal brief filed three-quarters of a century ago by
Louis Brandeis in support of a New York law forbidding the em-
ployment of women for night-shift factory work14° detailed the
hazards to which night work would expose them: the terrible con-
sequences of "deprivation of sunlight,"'' the difficulty of getting
enough rest during the day,142 the high mortality rates among
night workers, 143 the dangers that might befall women walking
home in the dark, ' 4  and the hardships of combining motherhood
and night work. 14 5 Night work was hard on men too, Brandeis ac-
knowledged, brutalizing them, 46 often robbing them of a real
home life,'47 and delivering them to drink; 48 but someone had to
do the work. "Ignorant women can scarcely be expected to realize
the dangers not only to their own health but to that of the next
generation from such inhuman usage."' 49 Women needed to save
139. The rationale for OSHA's maximum lead-exposure standards is protection of indi-
viduals against marketplace excesses. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1991).
140. A summary of "Facts of Knowledge" Submitted on Behalf of the People in Support
of its Brief, People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1915) (prepared by
Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark) (the following discussion of "Facts of Knowl-
edge" is based on excerpts reprinted in Becker, supra note 76, at 1223-24, and draws upon
Becker's analysis).
141. Id. at 97-111.
142. Id. at 54-96.
143. Id. at 111-55.
144. Id. at 252-60.
145. Id. at 121, 125, 138-39, 141, 174-97, 213-26.
146. Id. at 232-33.
147. Id. at 219.
148. Id. at 232-33.
149. Id. at 175-76.
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their strength for the next generation, Brandeis contended.150 All
that truly mattered was the biological imperative.
Similar arguments lie behind modern fetal hazards policies.
Then and now, mostly "bottom line" concerns have motivated cor-
porate policy. In Brandeis' day, because a ready supply of men was
available to fill night-work factory jobs, women became dispensa-
ble; but female nurses were too badly needed to be eased out in the
name of protection, and so New York's law made an exception for
night nurses.15 ' Similarly, contemporary arguments for fetal pro-
tection most often prevail at companies like Johnson Controls,
where there are men ready to do the work. 15
2
Inequality between the sexes has been institutionalized in this
way in order to promote competitive advantage in the market-
place-then sanitized as a safeguard for the unborn, the uncon-
ceived, and even those unlikely ever to be conceived. Meanwhile,
women who demur from such judgments must submit to the ama-
teur psychologizing of male judges. "Since [women] have become a
force in the workplace," Judge Coffey wrote, "it would not be im-
probable that a female employee might somehow rationally dis-
count this clear risk [to her prospective children] in her hope and
belief that her infant would not be adversely affected ....
The deeper problems posed by the fetal hazards rule surfaced in
the Seventh Circuit dissenting opinions. Although the existing pol-
icy is overly broad, said Judge Posner, not all fetal hazards rules
would necessarily fail the test of business necessity. 54 Facts about
relative risk, choice, and feasible alternatives-facts missing from
the record-would be critical in giving meaning to the concept of a
"normal" business operation.155 "It is possible to make batteries
without considering the possible consequences for people who
might be injured in the manufacturing process, just as it would be
150. Id. at 8, 490.
151. JEANNE M. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S HEALTH 176-77 (1977).
152. See Maureen Paul et al., Corporate Response to Reproductive Hazards in the Work-
place: Results of the Family, Work and Health Survey, 16 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 267 (1989)(re-
porting higher incidence of policies excluding female workers in male-dominated industries).
153. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d. 871, 897 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
154. Id. at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 906-07 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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possible to make batteries with slave laborers, but neither mode of
operation would be normal,' 56 Posner jibed. In his view, "normal"
could encompass "civilized, humane, prudent, ethical" 157 concerns
as well as those of cost and quality.'58
Judge Easterbrook in his dissent also acknowledged the "great
complexity"5 9 of the matter, but he read the law's command much
more narrowly. In his view, when the question is the permissibility
of keeping women off the job, the statute's exception for "normal"
business operations'6" is not a license for an employer to express
"concern for the welfare of the next generation." '' Paternalism
had no place in Easterbrook's assessment of existing antidis-
crimination law, which leaves the hard choices between health and
career, and between generations, entirely with the woman. 2 That
reading eventually prevailed in the Supreme Court. 63 Although it
does not lack legal plausibility, it offers at best an incomplete
guide to social justice.
IV. FETAL PROTECTION IN THE COURTHOUSE, PART Two:
THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court made quick work of the arguments that had
persuaded three circuit courts: that fetal vulnerability policies were
gender-neutral because they promoted the welfare of future gener-
ations' or that gender specificity was defensible in the name of
fetal protection because only women could transmit lead to the fe-
tus. 16 5 Specifically recalling the story of Donald Penney, who
wanted to father a child but had been refused unpaid leave by the
company, the majority opinion noted that "[t]he bias in Johnson
Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are
156. Id. at 904 (Posner, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 908 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 912 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 915 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
163. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
164. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982).
165. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 886.
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given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive
health for a particular job."1 6
Fetal hazards rules could be justified only as a sex-based em-
ployment policy under the bona fide occupational qualification
provisions of Title VII. According to the majority, the term "occu-
pational" should not be interpreted as meaning whatever an em-
ployer decided was related to a job, as Justice White's concurring
opinion proposed, 167 because that reading would effectively gut the
law; it relates only to qualifications that touch "the core of the em-
ployee's job performance." 168 The fetal hazards rule failed this test
because it was aimed at a social, not an occupational concern, and
did not reflect an interest in safety related to the " 'essence' ",169 or
"'central mission of the employer's business.' "170 Although the
claims of unconceived fetuses are socially important, said the Jus-
tices, they are legally irrelevant, because fetuses are neither em-
ployees nor "customers nor third parties whose safety is essential
to the business of battery manufacturing.' 171 Even if "hiring fertile
women will cost more,"'7 2 that fact would not be a legitimate rea-
son to discriminate against them.'7 3 Nor did the specter of tort lia-
bility justify the company's fetal hazards policy; practices consis-
tent with Title VII cannot give rise to liability under state law, the
majority opinion intimated.
The text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,11' with
what amounts to its own bona fide occupational qualification test,
offers independent support for the proposition that "ability or in-
ability to work"' 7' is the only possible reason to treat pregnant or
potentially pregnant employees differently. That Act has been in-
terpreted as meaning that an employer legally cannot order a preg-
nant woman to stop working late during pregnancy out of concern
166. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202.
167. Id. at 1210 n.1 (White, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 1206.
169. Id. at 1205 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977)).
170. Id. at 1205 (quoting Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).
171. Id. at 1206.
172. Id. at 1209.
173. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
175. Id.
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for the welfare of an actual fetus.'76 Surely, then, Johnson Controls
could not keep Queen Elizabeth Foster, who was not pregnant, off
the battery-making line because the corporation feared possible fe-
tal hazards; nor could the company do so to Ginny Green, who had
no intention of ever again becoming pregnant."' The Court read
the law as embracing a classic liberal conception of choice. "Deci-
sions about the welfare of future children must be left to the par-
ents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the
employers who hire those parents.' 178
At the turn of the century, in Muller v. Oregon,179 the Supreme
Court gave its legal blessing to special rules for female work-
ers-rules the Court regarded as benevolently motivated protec-
tion, but which operated as a handicap to women in the labor mar-
ket. "[T]his [fetal] health risk [is] quite different from the
concerns in Muller v. Oregon, which we would currently character-
ize as stereotypical rather than real,"'80 Judge Coffey contended in
his appellate opinion, but the Supreme Court begged to differ.
Pointedly citing Muller, Justice Blackmun observed that
"[c]oncern for a woman's existing or potential offspring historically
has been the excuse for denying women equal employment
opportunities.''8
Although Johnson Controls marked a real advance in social con-
sciousness, it failed to acknowledge that delivering choice is not
always the same as delivering social justice. It only posed new di-
lemmas for workers and for the society-dilemmas to which pae-
ans to volition offer an inadequate response.
Some years before the judgment in Johnson Controls, Betty
Riggs at American Cyanamid had "chosen" sterilization as a lesser
evil to losing her well-paying job.8 2 To Judge Robert Bork, who in
1984 had ruled in favor of that company's fetal hazards policy,8 3
176. See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-6 (1977).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
178. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207 (1991).
179. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
180. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 898 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
181. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
183. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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this was a meaningful decision. "I suppose the five women who
chose to stay on that job with higher pay and chose sterilization-I
suppose that they were glad to have the choice,'8 4 he said during
his 1987 Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Betty Riggs
thought otherwise. "I cannot believe that Judge Bork thinks we
were glad to have the choice of getting sterilized or getting
fired,"'85 she stated in a telegram to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. "Only a judge who knows nothing about women who need to
work could say that."' 6
The Johnson Controls decision has eliminated such Hobson's
choices, and wisely so, but the Court's opinion, and the rigid
framework of antidiscrimination law within which it operates,
leave other hard choices in the hands of economically vulnerable
workers. In the name of civil rights, this generation's Betty Riggses
can insist on working in toxic settings, even if doing so conceivably
means jeopardizing the health of their future offspring.
"By reason of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it would not
matter if all pregnant women placed their children at risk in taking
these jobs, just as it does not matter if no men do So,1 1187 Justice
Scalia wrote in Johnson Controls. That bluntly phrased proposi-
tion is correct in its refusal to define women entirely as the vessels
of reproduction that the Supreme Court in Muller more than
three-quarters of a century ago and, latterly, Judge Coffey would
have them be. It may represent "selecting the least evil [legal] op-
tion."1' 8 8 But, the hardest questions remain. Is this a wise and fair
rule, or instead a confession that reasoning about equal
rights-constitutional reasoning-does not begin to resolve the
deeper concerns about health and security for the men and women
of this and future generations?
184. S. ExEc. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1987) (quoting Judge Bork in his
testimony before the Judiciary Committee) (emphasis added).
185. FALUDI, supra note 24, at 450.
186. Id.
187. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1216 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Bertin Interview, supra note 58.
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V. BEYOND NONDISCRIMINATION
Perfect rationality might be the hope, but bounded uncertainty
better describes the reality within which judgments must be
made.189 Although one could wish for a world in which no worker
who contemplates having a child is exposed to any potential haz-
ard, such a wish contemplates an environment impossibly free
from all stresses, human as well as chemical. One can also aspire to
the adoption of substantive rules about toxic exposure that confi-
dently guide behavior, but the evidence regarding dangers of expo-
sure is imperfect and inevitably will remain so. 190 There are too
many different hazards to estimate, and the task of gauging their
distinctive effects-mediated as they are by genetics, environment,
and levels of exposure'91-poses formidable technical problems. In
an environment filled with risks and shaped by unknowns, the
more useful policy question becomes: Who is best situated to make
these decisions?
The standard of nondiscrimination, and the deeper respect for
personal autonomy on which the standard rests, suggest that af-
fected individuals are generally better able than corporations to
calculate the risk of toxic exposure to themselves and to their po-
tential offspring. The Supreme Court framed the Johnson Controls
case this way, emphasizing greater autonomy for workers, even as
it implicitly argued that autonomy would lead to better health out-
comes than would letting corporations make their own rules about
fetal hazards. 9'
What is missing from this analysis-and what the framing of the
dispute as simply a matter of discrimination prevents the Justices
from addressing-is a recognition that the determinations being
made affect more than workers and employers. Sensible fetal pro-
tection, like worker and corporate protection, calls for a process
that allocates risks and cost on a basis broader than either the
189. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982) (dis-
cussing how society determines what technical and environmental risks are worth taking).
190. See, e.g., supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of judg-
ing the danger of even a well-known substance such as lead).
191. See, e.g., supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (showing how even simple factors
can alter blood lead levels).
192. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208
(1991).
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market or individual rights, one that pays attention to the public
good. Uniform standards fixed by government can assure that cor-
porations do not frame safety calculations in terms of competitive
advantage; that they do not subject workers to choices too hard to
be borne fairly, with health risk set against the prospect of unem-
ployment; and that they pay attention to the welfare of those who
are not at the bargaining table. Such rule making can also take
into account real differences in circumstances, as the discrimina-
tion model cannot. 193
Defining this public good is the mandate of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration."" Even though OSHA rated
scant mention in the Supreme Court's opinion, its rules do limit
the freedom of maneuver for both individual workers and busi-
nesses.'95 When, as in the case of lead, OSHA sets maximum per-
missible exposure limits for toxics in the workplace, these cannot
be negotiated away for wage increases.9 s In 1978, when OSHA
adopted the standard for lead, widespread corporate opposition
arose because of the high cost of installing the needed technology
and the novel requirement that workers whose blood lead concen-
trations exceeded safe levels be removed from the hazardous set-
ting while remaining on the payroll.'9 7 But the agency's meticulous
review of the available evidence-resisting both corporate urgings
for laxity and unfounded claims of risk stemming from any expo-
sure level-can stand as a model for how government should pro-
ceed in the face of unavoidable unknowns.'98
The contrast between the Supreme Court's and OSHA's ap-
proaches to fetal hazards argues for shifting the locus of debate,
193. Cf. Pendleton E. Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal in
the Wake of International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1110
(1990) (criticizing the limitations of Title VII and its amendments and recommending a
statutory compromise to regulate workplace protection policies).
194. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
195. See, e.g., id. § 654 (requiring employers and employees to comply with federal
standards).
196. See id. § 655(d) (stating that permissible reasons for variances from standards do not
include negotiations with employees).
197. See United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (law-
suit by union and industry challenging new lead standards).
198. See Valentine & Plough, supra note 42, at 154-56 ("The lead standard of 1978... is
considered a model standard for regulating reproductive health hazards in the workplace.").
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away from a discrimination-oriented judicial review of an individ-
ual employer's fetal hazards policies, towards general standard-
setting. The bipolar, adversarial judicial process did not-
seemingly could not-take into account the relative profitability of
a company's approach to fetal hazards (which depends on the
firm's perceived need for female workers), the relevance of alterna-
tive sources of risk (which depends on the options realistically
available to employees), or the impact on overall worker safety. 99
199. Feminist legal scholars frequently have debated the wisdom of formulating gender
issues in terms of equal treatment. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 102, at 319 (asserting that
"[t]he law's traditional focus on equal treatment cannot cope with situations where the
sexes are not equally situated"); Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987
Sup. CT. REV. 201 (focusing on particular objections rather than universal principles, and
legislative rather than constitutional remedies); Herma H. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 39 (arguing that the model of racial equality fails in situations implicating bio-
logical differences between the sexes); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-
Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equal-
ity, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983) (finding equal treatment approach inadequate to
protect equal opportunity for women because of differences between the sexes); Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) ("a concept of
equality that denies biological difference has particularly adverse effects upon women");
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (arguing
for a conception of equality as acceptance, whereby differences between the sexes are
costless relative to each other); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1288-89 (1991) ("Where the sexes are different, and sexism
does not readily appear to work like racism-as with.., reproductive control... -discrim-
ination as a legal theory does not even come up."); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of a
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1371 (1986) (advocating an "inequality"
approach which focuses on domination, disadvantage or disempowerment); Nadine Taub &
Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality Require More than Assimilation, Accommodation, or
Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 825 (1985) (advocating
a disparate effects doctrine, to replace the formal equality approach); Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985) (comparing "equal treatment" and "special treat-
ment" approaches to sex discrimination); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 200 (1982) ("Do
we want equality of the sexes-or do we want justice for two kinds of human beings who are
fundamentally different?"); cf. DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 202 (1986) ("We reject
a government stiategy aimed at producing some fixed set of outcomes, either sex-based in-
distinguishability or sex-based differentiations.").
The "different voice" of women, which bears on conceptualizations of equality, is the
theme of a highly influential work by social psychologist Carol Gilligan. See CAROL GILLI-
GAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Feminist theoreticians previously have analyzed varia-
tions on that theme. See, e.g., SUSAN GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING WITHIN
HER at xvi (1978) (the book is "not so much utopia as a description of a different way of
seeing"); ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 14 (1980) ("At bot-
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When OSHA and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) addressed the same issue in 1980,200 three years after
adoption of the lead rule, the aspiration was not a workplace free
from sex discrimination, where male and female workers would be
equally entitled to put themselves and their fetuses at risk.201 In-
stead, the intention was to protect the entitlement of all workers to
a safe environment, while acknowledging the importance of worker
autonomy.202 Those guiding principles led OSHA and the EEOC,
in drafting fetal vulnerability guidelines, to emphasize the
processes of production, rather than the characteristics of suppos-
edly hypersusceptible women workers.203 Those principles also
made OSHA skeptical of the claim that, because women alone were
vectors of lead transmission, companies could exclude them from
jobs for the good of their prospective children.20 4 "There is a priori
no reason to believe that the genetic material of a male worker is
in any way more resistant to toxic occupational injury than that of
the female."20 Before such a claim could be valid, scientific study
was needed to examine paternal as well as maternal contributions
to the ways lead was passed to the fetus.206
OSHA and EEOC were also unwilling to approve fetal hazards
rules that treated all women as if they were perpetually pregnant.
A corporation's fetal hazards policy could single out only women
who were in fact pregnant; and although the federal guidelines al-
lowed a corporation to remove these women from toxic settings, it
first must have tried and found wanting a specified range of less
intrusive strategies for promoting health.0 7 Moreover, under the
guidelines, transferred workers would retain the full benefits of
tom of my argument is the conviction that justice requires men and women to be treated
differently, not in all areas but in some important ones.").
200. See Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive
Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1603 and 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-
20) (proposed Feb. 1, 1980); infra note 217 (stating that the guidelines were later
withdrawn).
201. See Bayer, supra note 80, at 640.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 642.
204. Id. at 641.
205. Rawls, supra note 98, at 29.
206. See Bayer, supra note 80, at 642-43.
207. Id. at 641-42.
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their seniority, 08 a requirement with enough financial bite to spur
corporate innovations short of exclusion. In sum, "reproductive
hazards were not to be considered more significant than other oc-
cupational harms [and] . . . the potential risk to the fetus was not
to be treated more seriously than risks to reproductive capacity
itself. Fetal priority was thus dislodged. '2u
9
These proposed standards made almost all the interested parties
unhappy, but for sharply differing reasons.21 0 Corporations fretted
about both the unbearable costs and the moral irresponsibility of
the new rules. Fortune 500 companies such as Monsanto and Gen-
eral Motors assailed them as unconscionable, insisting that the
claims of the fetus, this "uninvited visitor," should come before
those of the mother.211 " 'Since the fetus derives no primary bene-
fit from its unknown or known presence in the workplace, it should
not be exposed to excessive risks,' 11112 declared the Synthetic Or-
ganic Chemical Manufacturers Association. "This is a small price
for mothers, potential mothers, and society to pay. ' 213
On the other side, the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU ar-
gued that offering job protection to pregnant women was not
enough; the decision whether to accept a transfer had to be made
by the women themselves. 214 The Steelworkers Union complained
that by allowing businesses to transfer pregnant women, govern-
ment was putting a " 'good housekeeping seal' ",21, on sex discrimi-
nation.216 In 1981, less than a month after the Reagan administra-
tion took office, the guidelines were withdrawn2" 7-and with them
went the last comprehensive attempt to devise a fetal hazards pol-
icy that incorporated both a civil rights and public health
perspective.
208. Id. at 642.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 643-50.
211. Id. at 644.
212. Id. (quoting the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 648.
215. Id. at 649.
216. Id.
217. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1603 and 41 C.F.R. pt.
60-20) (withdrawal of guidelines proposed on Feb. 1, 1980).
[Vol. 34:101
FETAL HAZARDS AND GENDER JUSTICE
In its Supreme Court brief, Johnson Controls argued that it
should be permitted to impose health precautions more stringent
than those that OSHA laid down for workers generally.21 As the
company pointed out, in other contexts OSHA's regulations create
only minimal safety standards which a firm can exceed.219 The law
authorizes an employer to remove workers with lower blood lead
concentrations than those specified as unsafe by OSHA from the
line for the worker's health2 2°-why should a company not have
the same freedom when it considers a fetus to be similarly at risk?
"In this day and age," declared Johnson Controls, "it cannot seri-
ously be disputed that a company's desire to avoid direct harm to
its employees and their families, its customers, and its neighbors
from its own toxic hazards goes to the heart of its 'normal opera-
tion.' 221 The National Safe Workplace Institute, a pro-union and
pro-OSHA group, made much the same point in its amicus brief:
"[E]mployers must be held fully accountable for workplace injuries
and illnesses and thus must be given discretion to make safety and
health decisions, even when those choices are contrary to the eco-
nomic interests of employees. That philosophy is embodied in the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. '222
It makes better structural sense, however, for OSHA, not the af-
fected company, to fix the ground rules. When corporations argue
that fetal protection requires absolute safety, that redesigning the
workplace in order to achieve the desired safety levels is too expen-
sive, and that tort liability could bankrupt businesses, their state-
ments represent attempts-entirely sensible from their perspec-
tive-to shift the costs of childbearing in potentially dangerous
settings to those who may be put out of work. For their part, when
unions demand that employers allow fertile women to remain on
the job, even in environments where there is some risk, and that
corporations reduce the level of exposure to hazardous substances
218. Brief for Respondent, supra note 74, at 35-36.
219. Id. at 36.
220. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1991).
221. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 74, at 18 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1988)).
222. Amici Curiae Brief of National Safe Workplace Institute, in Support of Respondent
at 5, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (No. 89-
1215).
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so that all workers are protected, they make a claim on the re-
sources of corporations and society generally. By contrast, OSHA
has a less direct financial stake in the issue than a union or corpo-
ration, and can balance cost and safety concerns on an industry-
wide, not company-specific, basis. It can assign a value to safety,
using techniques more reliable than the inefficient, after-the-fact
system of liability law. OSHA is also less insulated from politics,
more subject to the salutary push and pull of lobbying by women's
groups, unions, and trade associations. In this respect, the wide-
spread unhappiness that the short-lived 1980 guidelines evoked
demonstrates not agency wrong-headedness but institutional
integrity.
Involving the constituents in setting standards does not imply
that all rules about reproductive health hazards will be sex-neutral,
because science does not mirror so neatly principle or ideology.
The 1980 guidelines on fetal hazards, with their limited authoriza-
tion of involuntary transfers from highly toxic environments, ac-
knowledged as much.223 There will be instances in which one sex is
so evidently more vulnerable to fetal risk that a sex-differentiated
rule makes sense: the biological agent CMV is one such instance,
the pesticide DBCP another. 24 Such determinations, however, are
best made by an agency situated to appreciate the full implications
of such distinctions.
These assessments remain OSHA's responsibility after Johnson
Controls, and the agency needs to do more. Workers deserve better
information on the health risks that toxic exposure invites, even
with feasible safety standards in place. Companies should offer ec-
onomic security, job retraining, and medical insurance to workers
who are removed or voluntarily remove themselves from unavoid-
ably hazardous jobs. Research on reproductive risk, especially
studies of paternally mediated effects of various toxics, should be
encouraged, because the available evidence offers diminishing sci-
entific support for singling out women as the unique conveyors of
risk. Although there was dicta in Johnson Controls that corpora-
223. In oral argument in Johnson Controls, Marsha Berzon, who represented the plain-
tiffs, acknowledged that a company legally could treat "pregnancy-related harms similarly
to other temporary instances of hypersusceptibility .... [O]ne could remove the people tem-
porarily." Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 6-7.
224. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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tions that follow OSHA's safety standards are legally insulated
against the possibility of mega-judgments in fetal tort suits, 225 ex-
plicit federal legislation would usefully remove all doubts. It would
make sense to use the money thus saved in court costs and lawyers'
fees to help pay for retraining and health insurance.
VI. CONCLUSION: HARD CHOICES
The modern workplace swarms with thousands of substances po-
tentially dangerous to the fetus, everything from manganese to
gamma rays.226 The sources of danger extend far beyond the as-
sembly line, crossing the sex line to affect men as well as women
and leap-frogging the line that separates work from pleasure.
Scientists regularly deliver warnings about what pregnant women
eat, drink, and smoke,227 and in some jurisdictions women who use
illegal drugs during pregnancy face criminal charges s.22  In this
sense, lead, crack cocaine, and even junk food inhabit the same
moral universe.229
The more we learn about these insidious dangers, the more re-
markable it seems that a fetus can navigate the perilous voyage
from conception to birth healthy and intact. All this knowledge,
however, answers none of the most fundamental questions for the
Justices230-or for ourselves. It only sharpens the value
225. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208 (1991).
226. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 69, 71, 94.
227. See, e.g., ERNEST L. ABEL, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME/FETAL ALCOHOL EFFECTS (1984)
(discussing the history, risk factors, and physical harms of alcohol consumption during preg-
nancy); MICHAEL DORRIS, THE BROKEN CORD (1989) (explaining fetal alcohol syndrome); RE-
PORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR WOMEN (1980)
(concluding that smoking is a significant threat to the outcome of pregnancy and to the
health of the baby); Richard B. Everson et al., Quantitative Associations Between DNA
Damage in Human Placenta and Maternal Smoking and Birth Weight, 80 J. NAT'L CANCER
INST. 567 (1988) (surveying the potential damage to fetuses of mothers who smoke).
228. See, e.g., State v. Grubbs, No. 4FA-$89-415 Criminal (Alaska Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1989)
(sentencing a cocaine-addicted mother to six months in jail for drug use during pregnancy);
State v. Christenson, No. CRI. 90 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1990) (sentencing a mother to six months in
jail for giving birth to a baby with cocaine in its bloodstream); cf. Reyes v. Superior Court,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (reversing conviction of mother who used heroin
during pregnancy).
229. See Katha Pollitt, Fetal Rights: A New Assault on Feminism; Laws Protecting the
Fetus from the Mother, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1990, at 409.
230. In a pointed colloquy with Johnson Controls' attorney, Justice Scalia asked: "How
does the Court go about determining what level of protection for fetuses is enough ....
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choices-between the claims of the generations; between maintain-
ing personal sovereignty and surrendering that sovereignty to those
who, whether for profit or paternalism, would protect us from our-
selves; between the principle of identical treatment and the murk-
ier aspiration to equity. The story of International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc. offers a way to sift through the implications
of those choices.
[When] there is a very, very tiny risk .... The workplace is full of risks .... How are we to
determine what the proper balance of risk to fetus and freedom for the women to work in
the marketplace is?" Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 41-42.
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